Der Tagesspiegel:

Wie tickt der Afghane? Wie der Iraker? Die USA sind überzeugt, dass man Kriege nicht allein militärisch gewinnen kann.

Via Michael Wald.

Peter Charles Choharis und James A. Gavrilis:

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fanaticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international development assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international development aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

Via Small Wars Journal.

BBC World Service:

It was written by the military scholar Sun Tzu about 2,500 years ago and still has tremendous relevance to war now.

Over the centuries it has been influential to both traditional armies and guerrilla fighters - the IRA, for instance, read it with interest and commanders in the first Gulf war and the recent war in Iraq have spoken of the influence of Sun Tzu on direct military operations and the intelligence cycle during extended wars.

But ultimately the moral of Sun Tzu's book is that the greatest leaders avoid war.

Warum genau ist das deutsche Öffentlich-rechtliche noch mal so uninteressant?

Via Mark Safranski.

Sascha Stoltenow:

Warum aber diese Bewegung so schwer ist, zeigen exemplarisch zwei Beiträge, welche die AIK nun in dem Bereich ihrer Veranstaltungswebseite veröffentlicht hat, der unter dem Navigationspunkt “Social Media” die Bezeichnung “Blog” zugedacht wurde. Mit Datum vom 17.5.2010 erwartet uns unter der Überschrift “Pressemitteilung” nicht etwa die Pressemitteilung, sondern ein Link auf die Presseseite der Veranstaltung, wo dann die Nachricht zu finden ist, dass die AIK ein Symposium veranstaltet - inklusive eines Links zum Download der Pressemitteilung als PDF.

Das ist allerdings nicht nur ein Problem von Regierungen – dem stehen einige Firmen und Konzerne in nichts nach.

Zu Govermedia.

Jason Sigger:

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack.

I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios."

Verwandt: FUD.

Via Tim Stevens.

Zeit Online:

Gestützt auf Atomwaffen und eine eigene Raketenabwehr will die Nato den Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts begegnen.

Selbstverständlich auch mit Cyberwar™-Strategie.

The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection:

Why has cultural knowledge suddenly become such an imperative? Primarily because traditional methods of warfighting have proven inadequate in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. technology, training, and doctrine designed to counter the Soviet threat are not designed for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain.

Da hatte ich jüngst auf 3sat etwas zu gesehen: Bundeswehr sucht interkulturelle Berater. Besser spät als nie? Wie wär's mit überhaupt gar nicht erst müssen.

Robert Wright:

So maybe the question to ask is whether Americans should be convinced of that — whether assassinating terrorists really helps keep us safe.

There’s no way of answering this question with complete confidence, but it turns out there are some relevant and little-known data. They were compiled by Jenna Jordan of the University of Chicago, who published her findings last year in the journal Security Studies. She studied 298 attempts, from 1945 through 2004, to weaken or eliminate terrorist groups through “leadership decapitation” — eliminating people in senior positions.

Her work suggests that decapitation doesn’t lower the life expectancy of the decapitated groups — and, if anything, may have the opposite effect.

Die Kommentare zu dem Artikel sind auch lesenswert. Interessant der Vergleich zu den Kommentaren beim heutigen Artikel der Zeit, Taliban in Kundus führerlos. Zudem wird sich zeigen, ob die Aktion dann auch das gewünschte Ziel erbracht hat, oder ob Frau Jordan recht behalten soll.

Red Team Journal:

The intangible qualities that characterize a good red team can be difficult to measure but are arguably just as critical to success as a team’s technical proficiency. In fact, a technically proficient but arrogant red team may actually be less useful than a less proficient but more humble and adaptable one. After all, the less proficient but adaptable team can always contract the expertise it needs, particularly if it is first willing to consider and ask the right questions.

Ich bin gerne im “Red Team” (dafür scheint es keinen deutschsprachigen Ausdruck zu geben), besonders in Kunden-Projekten.

Via Shloky Vaidya.